STILL DIGGING:
G20 GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO FINANCE THE CLIMATE CRISIS

MAY 2020
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In 2015, governments around the world committed to hold global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius (°C) and to strive to limit warming to 1.5°C by adopting the Paris Agreement. This analysis shows that since the Paris Agreement was made, G20 countries have acted directly counter to it by providing at least USD 77 billion a year in finance for oil, gas, and coal projects through their international public finance institutions. These countries provided more than three times as much support for fossil fuels as for clean energy.

With the health and livelihoods of billions at immediate risk from COVID-19, governments around the world are preparing public spending packages of a magnitude they previously deemed unthinkable. In normal times, development finance institutions (DFIs), export credit agencies (ECAs), and multilateral development banks (MDBs) already had an outsized impact on the overall energy landscape and more capacity than their private sector peers to act on the climate crisis. In the current moment, their potential influence has multiplied, and it is imperative that they change course. The fossil fuel sector was showing long-term signs of systemic decline before COVID-19 and has been quick to seize on this crisis with requests for massive subsidies and bailouts. We cannot afford for the wave of public finance that is being prepared for relief and recovery efforts to prop up the fossil fuel industry as it has in the past. Business as usual would exacerbate the next crisis—the climate crisis—that is already on our doorstep.
The science is clear. We must cease all government support for oil, gas, and coal if we are to limit warming to 1.5°C and avoid the worst of the climate crisis. G20 countries must uphold their joint COVID-19 commitment “to support an environmentally sustainable and inclusive recovery.” This means their public finance must support a just transition from fossil fuels that protects workers, communities, and the climate—both at home and beyond their borders—in order to build a more resilient future.

This report summarises public finance flows for energy from bilateral G20 public finance institutions and MDBs in the post-Paris period. We compare these figures from 2016 to 2018 to those from 2013 to 2015, which were originally published in our 2017 report Talk is Cheap. We find:

- **Support for fossil fuels has not dropped since the Paris Agreement was made.** Progress on coal took a step backwards compared to 2013 to 2015, with annual average support for coal from G20 countries increasing by $1.3 billion. Support for oil and gas stayed steady at $64 billion a year, showing that public finance institutions are far from aligning their financing with what is necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C.

- **Export credit agencies (ECAs) were the worst public finance actors,** providing nearly 14 times as much support for fossil fuels than clean energy with $40.1 billion a year for fossils and just $2.9 billion for clean energy.

- **Development finance institutions (DFIs) have not supported a transition away from fossil fuels.** DFIs provided $25.1 billion annually for fossil fuels and $8.1 billion annually for clean energy, similar to what they financed in 2013 to 2015.

- **Multilateral development banks (MDBs) increased their fossil fuel support compared to 2013 to 2015.** They provided $11.5 billion to fossil fuels annually—a increase of $3.4 billion over the previous period due to increased finance for oil and gas.

- **Most of this fossil fuel finance flowed to wealthier countries.** Nine of the top fifteen recipients were high or upper-middle income countries by the World Bank’s classification. Six were lower-middle income, and only one low-income.

China, Canada, Japan, and Korea provided the most public finance for fossil fuels between 2016 to 2018:

- **China** was the largest provider of public finance for fossil fuels—for both oil and gas, as well as coal—with $20.2 billion a year for oil and gas, and $4.4 billion for coal. This is a dramatic increase in China’s support for fossil fuels compared to 2013 to 2015.

- **Canada** was the second largest supporter of fossil fuels with $10.6 billion a year, all of which went to oil and gas. This is especially notable considering the relatively small size of Canada’s economy and population.

- **Despite the increasing number of restrictions on financing for coal, including for OECD export credit agencies, Japan and Korea continue to provide $4.2 billion and $966 million a year respectively to coal projects.** Japan and Korea were also the third and fourth largest supporters of fossil fuels overall, providing $9.5 and $6.4 billion a year, respectively.

While there has been a slight uptick (2.9 percent) in support for clean energy in the current period (2016 to 2018) over the previous period (2013 to 2015), this is far smaller than what is needed from these bilateral and multilateral public finance institutions to ensure a rapid and just energy transition. Overall:

- **The European Investment Bank and the World Bank Group were leaders in financing clean energy projects with $4.7 billion and $3.5 billion a year, respectively.** Both grew this support by about 15 percent compared to 2013 to 2015.

- **Germany** was the largest public financier of clean energy with $3.1 billion a year, which was about a 25 percent increase compared to 2013 to 2015.

- **Japan** was the second largest public financier of clean energy with $1.3 billion a year, but this was a decrease of more than 50 percent compared to 2013 to 2015.

There are three G20 countries (United Kingdom, Canada, and France) and three MDBs (European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank Group) that have enacted full or near-full restrictions on direct coal financing, and 14 others with partial restrictions. These exclusions need to be rapidly expanded and extended across all G20 countries and institutions and put in place for oil and gas as well. Just one institution—the European Investment Bank—has a near complete commitment to exclude new oil and gas support, while France, Germany, Brazil, and six of the nine MDBs have partial restrictions.

To do their part to limit warming to 1.5°C and ensure a liveable future, G20 governments and the MDBs they control must:

- **Support a global, just recovery to COVID-19 that carves a path to resilient, equitable, and zero-carbon societies instead of further locking in fossil fuel production and use.** Recovery packages in response to COVID-19 must bail out workers and communities, not banks and polluting corporations. They must ensure a globally just outcome by prioritizing debt-free finance to the lowest-income countries and communities.

- **End all public finance for oil, gas, and coal projects.** This must include projects across the supply chain, as well as indirect support through related infrastructure, advisory services, technical assistance, or financial intermediaries.

- **Rapidly scale up investment in clean energy, energy efficiency, just transition plans, and universal energy access.** This should include aligning all financing and activities with a high probability 1.5°C emissions pathway.

- **Ensure transparent and timely reporting on all energy finance.** Due to poor reporting, the data presented in this report likely underestimates the extent of the flow of international public finance from G20 institutions to all energy sources.
NO ROOM FOR NEW EXPANSION
THE GLOBAL CARBON BUDGET MEANS NO NEW FOSSIL FUEL INVESTMENTS
Using data from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Norwegian energy consultancy Rystad Energy, research by Oil Change International (OCI) has found that the carbon dioxide emissions from burning the oil, gas, and coal in already-operating fields and mines globally would push the world far beyond 1.5°C of warming and would exhaust even a 2°C carbon budget (see Figure 1). Indeed, we can assume that some already-operating projects will also need to be decommissioned early to achieve a 1.5°C trajectory, especially in wealthy countries with a greater responsibility and capacity to act. This has been further underscored by the 2019 Production Gap report by the Stockholm Environment Institute, the UN Environment Programme and others, as well as a 2019 paper in *Nature*.

Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement calls for aligning financial flows with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. Our shrinking global carbon budget makes clear that this will require cutting off all finance for fossil fuel expansion as soon as possible. G20 governments and institutions must take the lead in doing so.

**Figure 1**: Carbon dioxide emissions from developed global fossil fuel reserves, compared to carbon budgets within range of the Paris goals.

Sources: Oil Change International analysis based on data from Rystad Energy, IEA, World Energy Council, and IPCC.
STRANDED ASSETS, UNMANAGED DECLINE, AND VOLATILITY

At this point in the climate emergency, continued investment in fossil fuels creates risks across society. Private and public investors alike will face stranded assets as decarbonization efforts scale up (transition and legal risk), or overinvestment will result in severe climate impacts from excess carbon dioxide emissions that will bring about shocks to the entire economy (physical risk). The industry has indeed already been showing signs of systemic financial risk; this is manifesting in the form of poor stock market performance and massive accumulations of debt among other metrics. Two new factors are now compounding these long-standing risks: unparalleled demand destruction from the still-unfolding COVID-19 crisis and the March 2020 oil price war. These shocks are expected to slash 20 to 30 percent of global oil demand by the end of May and to continue to impact demand for much of 2020 and possibly beyond.

The fossil fuel industry is responding to this outlook with increasingly aggressive lobbying for government bailouts via new subsidies, regulatory rollbacks, and public finance (see Box 1). Despite pre-existing pressures for decarbonization, industry projections prior to the oil price crash still anticipated $4.9 trillion in investment in new exploration and extraction for oil and gas for 2020 to 2030. While the projected growth in coal was less dramatic, the International Energy Agency estimated a staggering $714 billion in investment in coal across the value chain 2019 to 2030 under current policies.

Oil, gas, and coal producers will be doing everything they can to safeguard these expansion plans and attract as much of this projected investment as they can. However, given the increasingly risky investment environment, they will need to be even more dependent on public finance to be able to do so. Bailouts targeted towards oil, gas, and coal will not be able to stave off a volatile, unmanaged decline that will hurt workers and communities dependent on the industry, likely most gravely in low-income oil-producing countries. G20 governments and their public finance institutions have a critical opportunity to intervene and help end fossil fuel finance in a way that protects workers, communities, and the climate as they prepare their COVID-19 responses.

BOX 1: THE PUBLIC FINANCE RESPONSE TO COVID-19 SO FAR

With the health and livelihoods of billions at immediate risk from COVID-19, governments around the world are preparing public spending packages of a magnitude they previously deemed unthinkable. The fossil fuel sector has been quick to opportunistically respond to this with requests for massive bailouts, new subsidies, regulatory rollbacks, and the postponement of climate measures. In some jurisdictions they had already received considerable financial support at the time of this report’s publication:

- Public outcry likely helped lessen the magnitude of fossil fuel bailouts initially proposed in Canada, but early support in response to COVID-19 included a USD $5.3 billion investment and loan guarantee in Keystone XL pipeline from the Government of Alberta, USD $1.9 billion in aid for abandoned well clean up and methane leaks without fixing the regulatory gaps that allow polluters to shirk these responsibilities, a multi-billion credit facility for small and medium oil and gas producers through Export Development Canada (EDC), and other public finance programs oil and gas producers are eligible for through EDC and the Canadian Development Investment Corporation.

- The United States has expanded the eligibility of its program to help small and medium-sized businesses to allow fossil fuel companies to use the program to pay off their debts, meaning up to USD $471 billion in the CARES Act could be used to financially aid fossil fuel companies.

Outside of industry lobby groups the overwhelming call from civil society has been for governments to support a transition from fossil fuels that protects workers, communities, and the climate in order to build a more just and resilient future instead. These efforts have highlighted the need for wealthy government responses to take international equity into account; they must ensure that debt-free public finance and debt forgiveness are extended to low income countries and communities to support a just recovery to this crisis. In the briefing Resilient Societies or Fossil Fuel Bailouts, OCI details how governments can address the oil and gas sector in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis in ways that leave us more resilient — including through public finance measures like ending fossil fuel support, financing of Green New Deal packages, support for worker protections, and bringing the fossil fuel industry into public ownership with the explicit goal of a just and managed phase-out of production.

Some governments and public finance institutions have already taken steps to this end or have proposals under consideration:

- The New Zealand Climate Change Commission submitted recommendations for recovery that called for stimulus investments for recovery to avoid high-emissions assets and infrastructure and to invest in education and retraining to prepare workers for low-carbon jobs.

- Among other measures, the European Investment Bank has established a $27 billion guarantee fund to support the EU’s wider stimulus efforts, and $5.7 billion for recovery outside of the EU with the Bank’s president saying these measures will support climate goals.
THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO STOP FOSSIL FUEL FINANCE

Against this backdrop, there is a burgeoning movement aiming to starve these dangerous expansion plans of capital. As of the start of 2020, private and public institutions with assets worth a combined 14 trillion had committed to end financing for all or some categories of fossil fuels. The Royal Bank of Scotland, the European Investment Bank, and the University of California system, among others, have made commitments to freeze all or some types of new fossil fuel investments, and this momentum has begun to rapidly shift investment norms. However, as influential as this movement has been to date, it will have to scale up dramatically to prevent an overshoot of the global carbon budget. By ceasing to finance new fossil fuel projects, public financial institutions have the potential to play a catalytic role in prompting the wider energy finance landscape to do so.

WHY PUBLIC FINANCE MATTERS

Private and public financial investors alike will need to shift rapidly, but the role of public institutions is unique because of both their outsized influence on energy finance and their capacity and mandate to lead on climate action. This is especially true for the international G20-led public finance institutions, which this report focuses on due to their economic and political power.

Public finance is a massive pool of capital in its own right. Worldwide, 693 public banks own assets worth $37.72 trillion, and there is an overall estimated $73 trillion in public finance assets when central banks, sovereign wealth funds, pensions, and multilateral banks are also included. The export credit agencies (ECAs), development finance institutions (DFIs), multilateral development banks (MDBs), and other entities tracked in this report are only a small fraction of total public finance institutions, but they are among the most influential and seen as norm-setters in the financial sector.

PUBLIC FINANCE AS A CATALYST

Public finance for fossil fuels drives private investment in fossil fuel production that would not occur otherwise. There are four important mechanisms through which public finance institutions maintain this outsized influence on the energy landscape:

(A) CONCESSIONAL, DE-RISKED FINANCE ACTS AS A SUBSIDY

Public finance is often given at concessional (below-market) rates via longer rates of return, lower interest rates, and grant components. This means that public finance for energy acts as a subsidy that tips the scales in favour of the projects it supports. This leverage effect is indeed the fundamental rationale for public investment in a number of settings and sectors. Even where public finance is not concessional, the high credit ratings of public finance institutions act to reduce the risk for other entities as this finance is ultimately government-backed.

(B) LEVERAGING OF GOVERNMENTS’ POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE

Having a government-backed partner can be especially critical for multi-billion dollar “mega-projects” that are common in the fossil fuel sector. These projects are beyond...
the capacity of even the largest fossil fuel companies to finance single-handedly and require securing a wide array of partners, including public ones, to proceed with adequately-spread risk. Part of this risk reduction is the use of public finance institutions’ reputations to help minimise concerns around environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors.

(C) SIGNALLING OF GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES
Outside of bolstering individual projects, public finance institutions also send signals to investors as to which energy sources governments are prioritizing. For example, ECAs, which typically have the least concessional finance of the kinds of institutions included in this report, still operate as a key mechanism through which governments carry out their trade strategies. In this way, public finance institutions help shape norms in the broader financial sector.

(D) GREATER RESEARCH AND ADVISORY CAPACITY
Many public finance institutions have greater capacities and expertise to evaluate projects than their private counterparts. This helps build investor confidence in the projects they finance and contributes to norms and best practices in the broader financial sector.

THE MANDATE AND LATITUDE TO LEAD
As government-owned entities, public finance institutions should act in the public interest, including by tackling the climate crisis and ensuring a just transition to clean energy. Every G20 government is a signatory to the Paris Agreement (aside from the United States which has begun its formal withdrawal from it) and the Sustainable Development Goals, among other commitments to these principles. These institutions do not always act in the public interest—as evidenced by the ongoing investment in fossil fuels this report details—but there are stronger mechanisms to force them to do so in the public sector than there are for private finance actors. Indeed, there is evidence that the unprecedented and growing public support for bold climate action through popular movements, opinion polls, electoral discourse, and the threat of the legal risks inaction poses, has already compelled some public finance institutions to align more closely with the public good (See Box 10).

Proponents of various Green New Deal initiatives around the world have highlighted the catalytic role public finance institutions can play in scaling up climate solutions and ensuring a just transition. This is due to their ability to offer below-market rates, demonstrate a higher risk appetite, and plan for longer rates of return than their private counterparts. However, public finance institutions will be unable to play this role they are uniquely suited to if billions of their capital continues to flow to fossil fuels every year.

NO TIME FOR CLIMATE NIHILISM: WE HAVE THE SOLUTIONS
The barriers to rapidly reducing oil and gas dependence are not technical; they are political, driven by a lack of accountability of governments to the public and intentional obstruction by the fossil fuel industry. While the scale and timelines required to avert the worst of the climate crisis are dramatic, there remain realistic pathways to achieving them in an equitable manner. Successful large-scale economic transitions in the past have tended to be characterised by a concerted and coordinated effort by government with subsidies, pilot programs, regulations, and worker retraining programs. Public finance institutions are well-suited to support these methods of economic transition, if wielded for climate action rather than the interests of fossil fuel producers.

The costs of clean energy technologies have fallen dramatically in recent years. It is already cheaper to build and run new clean energy projects than fossil gas projects in almost all jurisdictions, and these costs are projected to continue to fall. Electric vehicles are anticipated to be cheaper to buy and run than combustion engine alternatives by the mid-2020s, and this is already the case many times over when mobility needs are met through electrified mass public transit instead. Distributed renewable energy is well-established as the least expensive and most reliable mechanism for delivering energy to communities lacking access to electricity. Similarly, the potential for low-carbon job creation is high—almost any sector provides more jobs per dollar of investment than the fossil fuel sector—but there is a critical gap of public finance and government leadership to ensure retraining, re-tooling, community-level transition, and infrastructure investment programs are in place.
**Development finance institutions (DFIs):**
Many countries have bilateral finance institutions with mandates to support development nationally or internationally, including national development banks and aid agencies.

**Export credit agencies (ECAs):**
ECAs provide government-backed loans, credits, insurance and/or guarantees for the international operations of corporations from their home country. ECAs provide public financial backing for risky projects, including energy projects, that might otherwise never get off the ground. Most G20 countries have at least one ECA, which is usually an official or quasi-official branch of government. It is important to note that there is no uniform structure for public export financing across the G20; while many countries have single dedicated ECAs, some have multiple institutions that provide different kinds of export finance, and other have ECAs that function as one arm of a wider institution.

**G20:**
The Group of 20 (G20) is a forum for 20 major economies to discuss issues of global concern, founded with an emphasis on financial stability. Members include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Between them, these countries represented 74 percent of global GDP in 2018 and are responsible for about 80 percent of global greenhouse-gas emissions.\(^{41}\)

**Government agencies providing energy finance:**
Some government departments also provide public finance for energy projects. These are not well reported on and are not included in this report.

**Multilateral development banks (MDBs):**
These institutions provide assistance to governments and the private sector. MDB shareholders, or owners, are its member governments. All MDBs are backed and governed by member governments, which allow them to provide finance to governments and the private sector at lower interest rates and on better terms (e.g. longer tenors) than could be obtained from commercial lenders.

**Government-owned banks:**
Some countries have banks that operate more like privately held banking institutions but are owned wholly or in part by the national government. This category also includes some private institutions that function as quasi-public finance institutions, particularly in the case of domestic infrastructure banks. While data has been collected for some of these institutions, it has not been included in the total amounts of public finance in this report.

**State-owned enterprises (SOEs):**
A state-owned enterprise is an entity created by a government to carry out commercial activities on its behalf. These institutions generally do not provide project finance and are therefore not included in the data totals for this report, but SOEs are heavily involved in energy production and benefit from government support. Examples of SOEs involved in fossil fuel production include state-owned oil and gas companies, state-owned coal mining companies, and state-owned utilities.
This report assesses trends in public finance for energy from G20 and G20-controlled institutions between 2013 and 2018, with a focus on the 2016 to 2018 as the “post Paris” period. It provides an update to the 2017 report Talk is Cheap, which looked at these transactions for 2013 to 2015.

WHAT ARE PUBLIC FINANCE INSTITUTIONS?
Public finance institutions are publicly owned or operated institutions that provide finance with a variety of possible mandates at both the subnational, domestic, and international levels. The finance provided by these institutions includes direct public transfers to beneficiaries through grants, equity, and loans, as well as the facilitation of private or other public transfers to beneficiaries through guarantees and insurance. In this report, 100 percent of the support provided to fossil fuel production through domestic and international financing is considered public finance when a government holds more than 50 percent of the shares in the bank or financial institution. Table 1 details the kinds of public finance institutions this reports covers.

PUBLIC FINANCE AS A SUBSIDY
In line with definitions from the World Trade Organization, we consider public finance a subsidy to energy production to the extent that it constitutes a “direct transfer of funds” (as with grants, loans, and equity infusion) or “potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities” (as with guarantees and insurance). However, due to the lack of transparency and robust reporting from public finance institutions, it is not possible to separate out what portion of public finance is a subsidy component. We therefore report the gross value of public finance from majority government-owned financial institutions for fossil fuel production as a subsidy. Note that, beyond what could formally be conceived of as a fossil fuel subsidy, other portions of public finance to fossil fuels act to fundamentally shift the energy landscape in favour of fossil fuels as detailed above in Why Public Finance Matters.

INSTITUTIONS COVERED
This report covers bilateral public finance institutions controlled by G20 governments, including export credit agencies (ECAs), national development banks, and development finance institutions (DFIs) as well as the nine major multilateral development banks (MDBs) (see Table 1 for classifications and the Appendix for a full list). Unlike the 2017 version of this report, Talk is Cheap, it does not include public finance directly from G20 government departments due to a gross lack of transparency. It also does not cover majority government-owned banks without a clear policy mandate, sovereign wealth funds, or public finance institutions with subnational governance. This report also does not consider subsidies to fossil fuel production at the national level in G20 state budgets, which previous analysis has indicated may provide an additional $80 billion per year in support to fossil fuel production.

Not all the public finance institutions assessed in this report function the same way. For example, some countries have institutions that are the sole issuer of export credits, while others have multiple ECAs, and some have DFIs that also provide export credits. The boundaries across institutions are often not cut and dry, but we have made efforts to disaggregate data across the sections of this report.

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<th>Type of Institution</th>
<th>Typical Mandate</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<td>Multilateral Development Bank</td>
<td>Promote sustainable development and reduce poverty. Chartered and governed by more than one country.</td>
<td>World Bank Group, Islamic Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Finance Institution</td>
<td>Promote sustainable development and reduce poverty. They may have secondary objectives based on national policy priorities. DFIs typically focus on bilateral finance but in the case of national development banks, their mandates may also include support for domestic industry.</td>
<td>China Development Bank (China), Agence française de développement (France), Nacional Financiera (Mexico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Credit Agency</td>
<td>Promote the export of goods and services from their country.</td>
<td>Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (Korea), Euler Hermes (Germany)</td>
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where possible to provide a clear sense of the financing trends in each category of institution. Generally, the three categories of institutions provide energy finance internationally, but they sometimes also provide domestic support. These domestic projects are also included where information is available.

SHIFT THE SubSIDIES DATABASE

This report utilises data from OCI’s Shift the Subsidies database, which tracks energy finance from public finance institutions from the bottom up, at the project level. Each finance entry is classified as fossil fuel, clean, or other based on the description of the project and project documents. In addition to reviewing information made publicly available by majority government-owned financial institutions and other public sources of information, this database draws information from the Infrastructure Journal (IJ) Global database and Boston University’s Global Economic Governance Initiative’s China Global Energy Database. Where there are aggregate estimates at the subsector level available that differ substantially from project-level reporting, we use these, as is the case for Export Development Canada and BPI France.

The amounts recorded reflect only the public finance dedicated to a project and not the value of the private finance mobilised by such transactions. Entries are included based on the date a transaction is finalised, not their initial announcement. Due to lags in reporting time an additional $8.6 billion a year for 2013 to 2015 is captured in this report than in Talk is Cheap.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF ENERGY FINANCE

Fossil Fuel: The oil, gas, and coal sectors. This includes access, exploration and appraisal, development, extraction, preparation, transport, plant construction and operation, distribution, and decommissioning. It also includes energy efficiency projects where the energy source(s) involved are primarily fossil fuels. Coal is separated from oil and gas finance in many sections of this report, but as many transactions combine support for oil and gas they are not disaggregated. Transactions are classified as ‘Mixed Fossil’ where coal as well as oil and gas support is present, or where it is unclear what mix of fossil fuels is involved.

Clean: Energy that is both low-carbon and has negligible impacts on the environment and human populations if implemented with appropriate safeguards. This includes projects with energy coming from naturally replenished resources such as sunlight, wind, rain, tides, and geothermal heat. This classification also includes energy efficiency projects where the energy source(s) involved are not primarily fossil fuels. It is important to note that a lack of consistent safeguards and transparent reporting from institutions means some projects classified as renewable here do not necessarily have negligible impacts on the environment and human populations. One of the policy recommendations of this report is for public finance institutions to adopt rigorous policies of free, prior, and informed consent for the communities potentially impacted by their projects.

Other: Projects where (a) the energy source(s) are unclear or unidentified, as with many transmission and distribution projects as well as (b) non-fossil energy sources that typically have significant impacts on the environment and human populations. This means large hydropower, biofuels, biomass, nuclear power, and incineration among other forms of energy that are not fossil fuels but also not consistently low impact, low carbon, and renewable, are included in the ‘other’ category.

LIMITATIONS DUE TO A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

Unfortunately, the transparency of investment data for public finance institutions varies greatly. Few of the institutions assessed in this report allow public access to detailed investment information, and therefore we report the gross value of public finance from majority government-owned financial institutions for fossil fuel production (not only the concessional value or subsidy component). Over 70 percent of the finance assessed in this report was provided in the form of loans, with the remainder split between other instruments. This high percentage of loans is especially relevant given the potential for default and therefore risk borne by governments that acts as an advantage to the energy projects financed.

Aside from the lack of transparency, there are other reasons the public finance figures identified in this report are likely to be significant underestimates. Majority government-owned banks, many of which are policy-driven in some aspects, are not included in this report (see Box 5). Crucially, the datasets used for this analysis also omit most finance delivered through financial intermediaries because the volume of finance for specific energy activities ultimately delivered through those intermediaries is often unclear. For the same reason, this dataset largely omits MDBs’ development policy finance (budget support for entire sectors or broad programs), which can account for as much as 40 percent of their total lending in a given year.45
Total international public finance for energy from G20 countries and the major MDBs they control averaged $132 billion annually between 2016 and 2018. Over half—58 percent—of this went to fossil fuels, and less than one-fifth to clean energy (Figure 3). Worse, the portion of public finance flowing to oil, gas, and coal has stayed steady relative to the 2013-2015 period. This means that after signing the Paris Agreement, G20 countries continued their public support for industry rather than withdrawing it. While support for clean energy increased by 2.9 percent, this came from a drop in support in the “other” category of energy finance rather than fossil fuels. Finally, it is worth noting the portion of support for coal rose 0.9 percent despite the OECD Agreement to exclude most coal finance in export credits, and many individual G20 countries and MDB pledges to stop financing coal.46

Figure 3: G20 country and MDB public finance for fossil fuel, clean, and other energy, 2013-2015 compared to 2016-2018

Source: Oil Change International Shift the Subsidies Database
FOSSIL FUEL FINANCE
Public finance for fossil fuels from G20 countries directly averaged $65 billion a year from 2016 to 2018. China, Canada, Japan, and Korea provided the highest levels of support with $24.8 billion, $10.6 billion, $9.5 billion, and $6.4 billion on average respectively. Another $11.4 billion in fossil fuel finance was provided annually by the nine MDBs.

When ranked for fossil fuel finance relative to the size of their populations, Canada, Korea, Japan, Italy, and then Saudi Arabia were the most outsized providers of public finance for fossil fuels.

COAL FINANCE IS UP, BUT THE NUMBER OF COAL-FUNDING COUNTRIES IS DOWN
While most countries maintained or decreased their finance for coal, it still rose as an overall percentage of energy finance relative to 2013 to 2015 because of increases from China, Japan, and India, making them the top three public financiers of coal in the G20 at $4.4, $4.2, and $1.5 billion a year on average respectively. Russia and France had coal finance on record from 2013 to 2015 but none from 2016 to 2018, while Canada, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Mexico, and Indonesia have had no recorded public finance support for coal since 2013. However, it is important to note that some of these governments provide public finance for coal outside of the institutions included in this report—for example the Government of Argentina consistently provides support for state-owned coal company Yacimientos Carboníferos RioTurbio.47 Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and India were the only countries providing more support from public finance institutions for coal than oil and gas from 2016 to 2018.

OIL AND GAS FINANCE REMAINS THE LARGEST CATEGORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE FOR ENERGY
China, Canada, Korea, and Japan were the four largest public financiers of oil and gas in the G20 respectively. Most notably, China’s public finance for oil and gas nearly doubled in 2016 to 2018 compared to 2013 to 2015. This increase was driven by just six multibillion-dollar transactions from the China Development Bank. For more background on China’s oil and gas finance, see Box 2.
CLEAN ENERGY FINANCE
G20 and MDB finance supporting clean energy accounted for less than one-fifth of the total public finance for energy from 2016 to 2018—an average of $24.4 billion a year—despite commitments to the Paris Agreement in 2015. The MDBs led in public finance for clean energy, providing 55 percent of the total from 2016 to 2018 with the European Investment Bank and the World Bank Group as the top two, and the European Bank for Reconstruction for Development fourth when ranked alongside G20 bilateral institutions.

Germany, Japan, Australia, and France were the four largest public financiers of clean energy from their bilateral institutions. Notably Japan, Brazil, the United States, China, and South Africa all cut their public finance for clean energy considerably in 2016 to 2018, compared to 2013 to 2015.

OTHER ENERGY FINANCE
Transmission and distribution activities without a clearly associated energy source, large hydropower, nuclear energy, and other project types not clearly clean or fossil fuel are all classified as ‘other,’ which is delineated in the methodology section of this report. Just under half of the finance in the other category went to electricity transmission and distribution, followed by 22 percent for large hydropower, and 5 percent for nuclear. China, the European Investment Bank, the World Bank Group, Brazil, the Asian Development Bank, France, and India provided the most public finance for these projects.

BOX 2: CHINA DOUBLING DOWN ON OIL AND GAS MEGA-PROJECTS
At $24.8 billion a year, public finance for fossil fuels from China for the years 2016 to 2018 was more than double that of the next highest-ranked G20 country, Japan. This was a jump of $9.8 billion a year for China from the 2013 to 2015 period. Sixty-seven percent of the finance over the three years was approved in 2016, meaning the amount of China’s finance for fossil fuels in 2017 and 2018 was a similar annual amount to the 2013 to 2015 period.

China’s public finance tends to be characterised by much larger-scale transactions than their counterparts in other G20 countries.44 Illustrating this, 53 percent of China’s fossil fuel finance across 2016 to 2018 went to just six loans for oil and gas projects in Brazil, Angola, and Russia. One of these was from Chexim, and the rest from the China Development Bank (CDB).

The CDB has continued to be by far the largest public financier for fossil fuels included in this study, making up about two-thirds of China’s fossil fuel support. However, China Silk Road Fund (SRF, a government equity fund), China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE, an ECA that solely provides export insurance), and the Export-Import Bank of China (Chexim, an ECA that provides equity and debt investments) all continue to support oil, gas, and coal and increased their financing relative to 2013 to 2015.

Getting China’s public finance institutions off of fossil fuels would have outsized impacts as projects they finance tend to attract finance from China’s commercial banks and enterprises to a greater degree than other G20 countries and this combined financing is often an explicit part of project contracts.49

China’s development finance model is structured in a way in which Chinese development financial institutions could make a more swift pivot away from fossil fuels than their peers if the government decides to.50 However, to date there has been little indication the Chinese government is prepared to do this. Their 2015 US-China joint statement contained vague indications that China would reduce its international fossil fuel finance, and their Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue has become slightly more stringent over time, but as this report shows, these have not yet translated into reduced international fossil fuel finance flows.51

BOX 3: JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER ABE SHINZÔ AND THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzô and his environment minister frequently mention the need to address climate change in international fora, calling for the need to make climate action “cool” ahead of last year’s climate summit, and for the G20 to take climate action.52 Despite this talk, Japan is the third largest G20 supporter of fossil fuels. Unlike other G7 countries which are phasing out coal domestically, Japan plans to add at least 22 new coal-fired power plants within the country.53 If built, these coal plants would emit an additional 74.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide every year, which is more than the total emissions of many countries.54 Worse, Japan is also pushing coal technology on other parts of the world, primarily in Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia, often offering technical support in the form of energy policy plans that centre the expansion of coal.55

Japan even recently acknowledged its “addiction to coal,” committing to conduct a review of its coal export policy with the goal of tightening the environmental conditions on which Japan will finance coal plants abroad.56 The problem with this plan is that Japan should be ending its support for all coal plants and related infrastructure, rather than tightening the qualifications for that support. Moreover, Japan has a record of dramatically exploiting loopholes of coal financing restrictions. Despite the OECD Coal Agreement placing restrictions on export credits for coal plants in 2017, Japanese export credit agencies still increased their support for coal by pushing through approvals before the OECD agreement’s start date and using the other considerable loopholes in the Agreement (see ECA Support for Coal Increased Despite the OECD Coal Agreement below). Comments from the governor of the Japan Bank of International Cooperation in May 2020 suggest the export credit agency will not be considering more financing for coal-fired power projects going forward, but this was not officially confirmed policy as of this report’s publication.57
Korean institutions have supported coal plants both internationally and domestically and are currently considering providing billions more in support to coal plants in Southeast Asia. Since international coal financing restrictions for OECD-member ECAs went into effect in 2017, Korean ECAs have provided $1.8 billion to the Cirebon 2 coal plant in Indonesia, the Vinh Tan 4 extension, and Nghi Son 2 coal plant in Vietnam. The plants under consideration include the 2,000 megawatt (MW) Jawa 9 and 10 coal plants in Indonesia and the 1,200 MW Vung Ang 2 coal plant in Vietnam. These plants come with harrowing health implications for the already vulnerable communities they are being built in; it is estimated that Jawa 9 and 10 alone will result in 2,400 to 7,300 premature deaths during the lifetime of the project. Widespread local opposition to these projects exists as evidenced by the lawsuits that local residents have filed against the Korean government. Korea is also building seven new coal power plants domestically. According to the environmental and social impact assessments for these plants, they will emit 60 million tons of carbon dioxide every year.

This ongoing international coal plant support is despite highly competitive renewable energy potential. As early as this year, it will be cheaper to build new renewables than to build new coal plants in Vietnam and Indonesia. There is potential for this shift to happen. South Korea’s election—held in April 2020 amid the pandemic—presents a new opportunity for the Korean government to finally pivot away from fossil fuels. The incumbent Democratic Party government won on a mandate to pass new energy legislation that would expand renewable energy and phase out overseas support of fossil fuels. The government must follow through on its Green New Deal manifesto and align its energy support with the Paris agreement by forcing early retirements of domestic coal plants and banning all overseas coal finance.

Table 2: Annual average of total public energy finance by G20 countries, USD millions, 2013 to 2015 compared to 2016 to 2018

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</table>

Source: Oil Change International Shift the Subsidies Database
AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE
Some significant sources of government-supported energy finance are excluded from this analysis, but still have major implications for global energy investment. In particular, majority government-owned banks and investment from state-owned enterprises are two substantial sources of public or quasi-public energy finance not included in this analysis. They are excluded from this analysis primarily because it is difficult to disentangle which decisions are being made on a commercial or market-driven basis, and which decisions are driven by policy or government priorities. Finance from majority government-owned banks is discussed further in Box 5.

BOX 5: GOVERNMENT-OWNED BANKS

Majority government-owned banks vary widely in terms of their operations and governance structures. Some, such as the Royal Bank of Scotland, majority-owned by the UK government, function nearly identically to commercial banks but happen to be majority-owned by a government. Others function more as policy banks, making them function like a national development bank rather than a commercial bank. Often, the bulk of the energy finance from these institutions is channelled to domestic activities rather than internationally, in contrast to the other types of institutions studied in this analysis. Because of these distinctions, these institutions have not been included in this analysis nor in the aggregate numbers presented in this report, but here we summarise the data available in OCI’s Shift the Subsidies database.

Among G20 countries, China and India have large banking systems where majority government-owned banks are common, while Russia has three large government-owned banks that are very active in the energy sector. In the UK, Royal Bank of Scotland, which is majority state-owned but functions as a commercial bank, is also a significant provider of energy finance. To a lesser but still significant degree, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico also have majority government-owned banks providing significant levels of public finance for energy. Indonesia also has a number of such banks active in the energy sector.

For some G20 countries, the energy finance activity of majority government-owned banks far outweighs energy finance from dedicated public finance institutions. For example, if India’s majority government-owned banks had been included in this report, India’s total fossil fuel finance between 2016 and 2018 would have shot from $1.7 billion to $2.6 billion a year, with more than two-thirds of that going to coal. Including these institutions would have put India’s recent levels of support for coal nearly on par with countries that have a better-known reputation as providers of global coal finance, such as China and Japan.

For Russia, including majority government-owned banks would have more than doubled Russia’s fossil fuel finance total, from $3.0 billion a year between 2016 and 2018 to $6.3 billion over the same period. Turkey, which has no data included in the other sections of this report due to poor reporting from Turk Eximbank and the Development Bank of Turkey, had at least $400 million a year in public finance for fossil fuels from its government-owned banks. China, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia also have significant majority government-owned banks that finance energy activities. Taken together, 67 percent of energy finance from the data available for G20 majority government-owned banks went to fossil fuels between 2016 and 2018. This is barely a change from the 69 percent for fossil fuels noted from 2013 to 2015.
Export credit agencies (ECAs) are official or quasi-official agents of the government that provide government-backed credit, insurance, guarantees, and loans for the international operations of corporations from their home country. It is important to note that there is no uniform structure for public export financing across the G20; while many countries have single dedicated ECAs, some have multiple institutions that provide different kinds of export finance, as with China, Japan, and Korea. Other countries have ECAs that function as one arm of a wider institution, as in Germany and France. The Appendix details which ECAs are included in this report.

ECAs continued to provide billions annually to fossil fuels from 2016 to 2018:

- ECAs provided $40.1 billion annually to support fossil fuel projects compared to $2.9 billion for clean energy.
- 78.6 percent of ECA energy financing went to fossil fuels, up slightly from 76.6 percent in 2013 to 2015. The most notable shift was finance for coal, which climbed from 10 percent of ECA energy financing to 14.7 percent.

**CANADA, JAPAN, CHINA, AND KOREA LEAD IN ECA FOSSIL FUEL FINANCING**

Four countries—Canada, Japan, China, and Korea—accounted for 79 percent of the G20’s ECA fossil fuel support from 2016 to 2018. Canada’s ECA, Export Development Canada (EDC), was the largest ECA supporter of fossil fuels, largely because of unusually high levels of domestic project finance (Box 6). Japan’s ECAs, the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) and the Japan Bank for International...
Cooperation (JBIC) were second, growing their support for coal, though more than halving their support for oil and gas.

China’s support for oil and gas projects through China Export Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE, which provides export insurance) and the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM, which provides other export financing), almost tripled in 2016 to 2018 compared to 2013 to 2015, nearly doubling their overall support for fossils.

Export–Import Bank of the United States (U.S. EXIM), typically a significant supporter of fossil fuels, was not able to support any project over $10 million because it lacked board quorum from July 2015 until May 2019. Its support across all sectors dropped to almost nothing during this period from a peak of $12 billion in 2012 for fossil fuels, and it is extremely likely that it would have otherwise provided billions of dollars in fossil fuel financing. A case in point, almost immediately after achieving board quorum, U.S. EXIM approved $5 billion for an liquid natural gas (LNG) project in northern Mozambique, the largest transaction in its history. In 2019, U.S. EXIM also approved $18 million for oil and gas projects in Argentina and about $40 million for coal mining projects. U.S. EXIM is likely to approve more fossil fuel projects in the near future as it is currently considering supporting gas projects in Argentina and Mexico. Moreover, the head of U.S. EXIM, Kimberly Reed, is actively working to increase the institution’s support for LNG despite it being worse for the climate than coal, in certain cases.

**ECA SUPPORT FOR COAL INCREASED DESPITE THE OECD COAL AGREEMENT**

In January 2017, restrictions on coal financing for OECD-member ECAs went into effect. The OECD Agreement prohibits OECD ECAs from supporting coal plants unless they use marginally more efficient ultra-supercritical technology or are small plants in the poorest countries (less than 300 MW for subcritical and less than 500 MW for supercritical). Only certain types of financing, such as export credit guarantees and insurance, direct credit financing and refinancing, and interest rate support, are covered.

Despite these restrictions, the ECAs of Japan and Korea continue to approve billions of dollars for new coal projects. JBIC, NEXI, and Export-Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM) are supporting the Nghi Son 2 coal plant in Vietnam even though it is a supercritical coal plant over 500 MW. JBIC and NEXI are supporting another supercritical coal plant that is over 500 MW—Van Phong 1, also in Vietnam. In addition, JBIC and NEXI are supporting Kalselteng 2 in Indonesia, even though it is a subcritical coal plant in a non-IDA country, which are prohibited from receiving support under the OECD ECA agreement. The ECAs are claiming that the Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) for these three projects were completed before 1 January 2017, when the agreement came into effect, even though none of them were made public before 2017.

Finally, coal plants also received ECA support because they were ultra-supercritical:

- JBIC, NEXI, and KEXIM are supporting Cirebon phase 2 in Indonesia.
- JBIC, NEXI, KEXIM, and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-SURE) are supporting the Vinh Tan 4 expansion in Vietnam.
- JBIC and NEXI are supporting Tanjung Jati B Unit 5 and 6 in Indonesia, JBIC could have financed these units even if they had not been ultra-supercritical because the type of financing JBIC provided, a loan agreement for project finance, was not restricted under the OECD agreement.

Driven by Japan and India, support for coal by G20 ECAs from 2016 to 2018 increased by $1.7 billion a year compared to 2013 to 2015. While coal financing from three of the main financiers—China, Korea, and Japan—decreased in 2018, it is hard to know whether this trend will continue since the commitment of funds often fluctuate widely from year to year. The dip in China’s support for coal, which is not a member
of the OECD and therefore not restricted by the Arrangement in its coal financing, indicates that there might be external market and geopolitical factors causing the 2018 decrease other than the OECD agreement. Another reason for concern is that JBIC, NEXI, and a few other ECAs are considering supporting at least nine coal plants, additional to those discussed.\(^\text{82}\)

**A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY OBSCURES THE TRUE MAGNITUDE OF ECA FINANCING**

The collection of the data used in this report relies mainly on the ECA’s public disclosure of their support for energy projects, but there are few requirements for them to do so. This means the data presented only includes a few projects for Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Brazil (who does not have an ECA but provides export credits through the Brazilian Development Bank), and Russia for the 2016 to 2018 person, and does not contain any transactions for the ECAs of Argentina, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey. This is due to a lack of access to data and is not necessarily reflective of low levels of fossil fuel project support.

**BOX 6: EXPORT DEVELOPMENT CANADA BACKING RIGHTS-VIOLATING OIL AND GAS PROJECTS AT HOME AND ABROAD.**

Export Development Canada (EDC) is the sole contributor to Canada’s second place ranking in this report for public finance for fossil fuels. This is poised to increase as the Government of Canada has made the corporation a key vehicle in its COVID-19 response, including increasing the cap on the EDC’s total possible liabilities, creating a credit support program for small to medium-sized domestic oil and gas companies, and broadening what kinds of activities EDC can support.\(^\text{83}\) EDC is rare among ECAs in that it supports Canadian companies for their domestic projects, as well as companies’ international projects. From 2013 through 2017, EDC facilitated at least CAD 4.4 billion (USD 5.3 billion) in activity to support several of the largest upstream and midstream companies involved in oil sands expansion and transportation, though this number is likely higher due to limited transparency in reporting at the project level.\(^\text{84}\)

This uncommon level of domestic support from EDC is a result of an expansion of its mandate to include domestic activities as a temporary emergency response to the global recession in 2008 that has never been reversed.\(^\text{85}\) Canada’s COVID-19 response has actually further broadened the allowances for EDC’s support of domestic activities. As a result of this broadened mandate and the more directly policy-driven “Canada Account,” EDC is supporting a number of domestic oil and gas projects that violate Indigenous rights and have massive carbon footprints, including the government-owned Trans Mountain Expansion (TMX) pipeline and the Coastal GasLink pipeline.\(^\text{86}\) This report includes CAD 6.5 billion (USD 5.0 billion) in financing for TMX that was disbursed from 2016 to 2018, but if the project is completed, a total cost of at least CAD 12.6 billion (USD 9.5 billion) is expected.\(^\text{87}\)

EDC’s recorded fossil fuel support in the Shift the Subsidies database is all for oil and gas, and in 2019 EDC made a de facto coal finance ban an official part of its climate policy.\(^\text{88}\) But EDC’s climate policy does not address its massive support for oil and gas.\(^\text{89}\) The Government of Canada has an urgent responsibility to use its COVID-19 response and EDC’s ongoing legislative review to shift EDC’s energy financing away from oil and gas to a just energy transition. EDC does not report aggregate clean energy support as they do for oil and gas, but for 2016 to 2018 the estimated annual average based on project-level reporting was magnitudes smaller than its oil and gas support at CAD 270 million (USD 200 million) a year.

**BOX 7: UNITED KINGDOM: COP26 HOSTS DISPLAY LACK OF LEADERSHIP**

Despite claiming to be a “climate leader,” the host of the crucial, but postponed, COP26 climate talks backs fossil fuel projects all over the world. As with most institutions in this report, a lack of transparent reporting has meant the true scale of the UK Government’s international fossil fuel finance is unknown. At least GBP 4.6 billion (USD 5.9 billion) was spent on fossil fuels overseas between 2010 and 2017 across UK Export Finance (UKEF), Commonwealth Development Corporation, and a range of government departments.\(^\text{90}\)

UKEF, the UK’s ECA, has played the most egregious role, giving 97 percent of its energy support from 2010 to 2017 to fossil fuels.\(^\text{91}\) A study of UKEF’s latest annual report suggested they gave GBP 2 billion (USD 2.6 billion) to fossil fuels in the 2018-2019 UK fiscal year alone, an eleven fold increase in fossil fuel support from the previous fiscal year.\(^\text{92}\)

As the UK gears up to host the most important climate conference since COP21 in Paris, which was originally supposed to take place in November 2020, but will now take place in Spring 2021, the Government has come under increasing pressure. Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has led international condemnation of the UK’s position.\(^\text{93}\) A cross-party committee of members of Parliament criticised the Government’s international aid policy as mitigating climate change with one hand and supporting fossil fuel projects with the other.\(^\text{94}\) A separate committee investigated UKEF and called on the government to end all taxpayer support for fossil fuel projects by 2021.\(^\text{95}\) Both have been ignored so far.

The Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, pledged in January 2019 to end support for coal in aid and export finance. However, the UK has not funded any new overseas coal plants since 2002, and the announcement leaves the UK’s huge support for oil and gas untouched.\(^\text{96}\) The UK cannot be a credible COP26 host unless it phases out all public finance for fossil fuels.
Development finance institutions (DFIs) have mandates to support development domestically or internationally, including national development banks and aid agencies. The data provided in this section does not include most energy financing provided through financial intermediaries, which channel a large and increasing portion of DFI support. Due to the severe lack of transparency of financial intermediaries, it is difficult to track which sub-projects end up being financed. The Shift the Subsidies data demonstrates that substantial sums go toward financing fossil fuels, but they in some cases have played an important role in distributing funds to distributed renewables.

Overall:

- DFIs provided nearly $21 billion each year to oil and gas projects from 2016 to 2018, only a slight decrease from the 2013 to 2015 period.
- The annual average of DFI support for coal from 2016 to 2018 was almost $3.9 billion, a slight increase from the $3.8 billion average from 2013 to 2015.
- DFIs provided $40.6 billion in public energy financing annually from 2016 to 2018, roughly the same as the support provided for energy projects in 2013 to 2015.
- From 2016 to 2018, DFI support for clean energy was 19.9 percent of total DFI energy support, an increase of only 1.5 percent over 2013 to 2015.
approved $1.7 billion in oil and gas projects in 2019, which is almost the same as OPIC’s total support from 2016 to 2018. DFIs are showing a great deal of interest—and in some cases have already committed financing—to oil and gas mega-projects in new expansion hotspots like Mozambique, Argentina, and Ghana.

NO PROGRESS MADE IN REDUCING DFI SUPPORT FOR COAL
Support for coal stayed stubbornly at 9.5 percent of DFI support from 2016 to 2018, which was the same as from 2013 to 2015. This demonstrates that despite commitments to do otherwise, progress has stalled in phasing out support for coal. China was the largest financier of coal, providing over $2 billion annually with India providing $997 million and $560 million annually from 2016 to 2018. Korea, Brazil, South Africa, and Germany were the other three contributors to coal projects with less than $150 million annually each.

DFI CLEAN ENERGY FINANCING BARELY BUDGES
The annual average for all countries’ DFIs financing of clean energy was $8.1 billion, an increase of less than $1 billion annually from 2013 to 2015. Germany’s DFIs remained the leader, providing about $2.4 billion annually from 2016 to 2018 in clean energy finance. In a reversal of its place in the fossil fuel financing ranking, China was near the bottom of the pack, providing a mere $188 million annually. Canadian, Russian, and Argentinian DFIs all have no recorded support for clean energy projects in the Shift the Subsidies database.
The nine multilateral development banks (MDBs) share a mandate for sustainable development, and have committed in multiple international fora to jointly align their finance with the Paris Agreement. While MDBs have a lower overall proportion of finance for fossil fuels relative to the other kinds of public finance institutions covered in this report, they also have the most concessional financing relative to the other kinds of institutions in this report, meaning that their finance for fossil fuels acts as a more significant subsidy to the industry on a per dollar basis.

Overall:

- MDB finance for energy averaged $40.2 billion a year from 2016 to 2018.
- $13.4 billion (33.3 percent) of this annual support went to clean energy, only somewhat higher than that for fossil fuels at $11.5 billion (28.5 percent).
- MDB support for fossil fuels was dominated by oil and gas for 2016 to 2018, at $10.6 billion a year or 26.3 percent of all energy finance.

The Islamic Development Bank (72.4 percent) followed by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (57.0 percent) had the highest proportion of finance for fossil fuels.

The New Development Bank (58.2 percent) followed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (49.4 percent) had the highest proportion of finance for clean energy.

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**Figure 13: Fossil fuel finance from MDBs, annual average 2016-2018**

![Bar chart showing fossil fuel finance from MDBs, annual average 2016-2018](source: Oil Change International Shift the Subsidies Database)
WANING MDB COAL SUPPORT REPLACED WITH OIL AND GAS
Due to exclusion policies on direct finance for coal, support fell from 1.8 percent of MDB finance in 2013 to 2015 to 0.1 percent in 2016 to 2018. All remaining coal finance for 2016 to 2018 was from the International Development Association in the World Bank Group in 2016 where support for coal was bundled into wider development policy finance – this still potentially represents important support for the sector but the kinds of policies recommended through these projects are not publicly available. MDB finance for fossil fuels stayed at the same levels compared to 2013 to 2015 (25.8 percent and $9.0 billion compared to 26.1 percent and $9.0 billion). This is because while finance for coal fell, support for oil and gas increased from 7.5 billion (21.4 percent) to 8.6 billion (22.8 percent).  

The World Bank Group, followed by the European Investment Bank, led the MDBs for the most fossil fuel finance for 2016 to 2018, a reversal of the top two from the 2013-2015. The EIB has committed to phasing out almost all of their finance for fossil fuels after 2021, and the World Bank Group to ending finance for upstream oil and gas finance after 2019, so it is expected their rankings will drop going forward unless other MDBs follow suit with similar exclusion policies.

INDIRECT MDB FINANCE FOR FOSSIL FUELS
While the quality of data for the MDBs is generally better than that for bilateral institutions, there are large gaps that are critical to note. The data largely excludes development policy finance—budget support for entire sectors or broad programs—which can make up as much as 30 to 40 percent of total lending at some MDBs in a given year. The data also excludes almost all of the significant and growing finance delivered through financial intermediaries. For example, the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank Group’s private sector lending arm, had a financial intermediary portfolio of $20.4 billion at the end of the fiscal year 2016. In both cases, these areas of financing are excluded because the lack of specificity in publicly disclosed information makes it impossible to reliably classify the finance according to energy source or category to the degree required for this analysis.

MDB FINANCE FOR FOSSIL FUEL EXPLORATION
From 2013 to 2015, MDB finance for fossil fuel exploration and extraction averaged $2.1 billion a year. While this roughly halved in 2016 to 2018 to $890 million, any level of ongoing MDB finance for fossil fuel exploration is alarming. It is well established that the combustion of the already-developed reserves of oil, gas, and coal would overshoot what would be a safe level of emissions, and that some early decommissioning will likely be needed to limit warming.
Table 3: MDB energy finance by institution and energy type, 2013-2015 compared to 2016-2018, USD millions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy Source</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Oil and Gas</th>
<th>Mixed Fossil</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Clean</th>
<th>All Energy</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2013 to 2015</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2016 to 2018</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>7,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>3,752</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>3,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>1,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Development Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>633</td>
<td>7,508</td>
<td>10,605</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>16,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oil Change International Shift the Subsidies Database. *Note that tracking for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank only began in 2016.
Public institutions often justify support for fossil fuels by saying it is needed in the poorest countries to help them develop and to provide them with access to electricity. This is flawed for two reasons. First, the data shows that the largest recipients of support for fossil fuels overwhelmingly tend to be countries that are not the poorest, and this trend continues for 2016 to 2018. Nine of the top 15 recipients of public finance were high or upper-middle income countries by the World Bank classifications. Six—Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Angola, and Pakistan—were lower-middle income, and only Mozambique in the low-income classification (see Box 9 for more on Mozambique).

In addition, it is a myth that fossil fuels are effective at supporting sustainable development. Where fossil fuel finance from G20 countries and MDBs does flow to lower-income countries, it has overwhelmingly economically benefitted multinational corporations and wealthy “donor” countries over local populations. These financial flows have also contributed to a record of human rights violations, displacement, and local health and environmental impacts from the industry. The harmful impacts of fossil fuel development on frontline communities are present in wealthier countries as well; environmental racism and frequent violations of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples associated with fossil fuel development are well documented globally. Furthermore, the inequities associated with fossil fuel extraction are set to be exacerbated by climate change.

The greatest shares of clean energy public finance have also flowed to the wealthiest countries, with United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Germany all in the top ten. India is the only low or low-middle income country in the top 10. Most of the top recipients for clean energy are receiving a considerable amount of their finance coming from their own domestic public finance institutions, in contrast to the outward flow of the same institutions’ fossil fuel finance. A wide variety of public support around the world is needed to ensure the transition to clean energy, but relatively little of the public finance analysed in this report is helping those lower-income countries most in need of support. This is despite much of this international public finance coming from institutions with a development mandate and a commitment to support climate action. As the volatility of fossil fuel markets increases in the face of COVID-19, it is more critical than ever for international public finance to be redirected towards a just energy transition instead.
Figure 15: Recipients of G20 public finance for fossil fuels, annual average 2016-2018

Source: Oil Change International Shift the Subsidies Database

Figure 16: Top 15 recipients of G20 public finance for fossil fuels by country, annual average USD billions, 2016-2018*

Source: Oil Change International Shift the Subsidies Database. *Note there are limitations in reporting on recipient countries especially in the United States and Canada that means some of their finance is excluded from this figure.
BOX 8: ARGENTINA FRACKING AS AN EMERGING PUBLIC FINANCE TARGET

Preliminary data and projects still under consideration suggest Argentina’s Vaca Muerta is likely to be a leading recipient of public finance in 2019 and 2020, though the oil price crash has made the future investment outlook beyond this uncertain. Vaca Muerta is one of the largest deposits of shale oil and gas in the world, and its rapid development is polluting the environment and trampling on the health, water, housing and cultural rights of Mapuche communities in the Neuquén province. Many of the projects in the region have gone forward without effective consultation or free, prior, and informed consent of impacted communities. One major impact is the potential for accidental releases of oil and fossil gas, which could adversely impact the safety of both drilling and plant personnel and the communities during product transport. Frontline communities have also raised concerns about recent earthquakes in Vaca Muerta, pointing to the extensive literature linking fluid injection from oil and gas extraction to increased earthquake risk. Furthermore, on top of uncertainty from the oil price crash, the projects are incredibly financially risky because of Argentina’s macroeconomic instability (devaluing peso, staggering debt), political uncertainty, and water scarcity, as well as the reliance of oil and gas companies on staggering government subsidies.

Argentina’s shale gas reserves could eat up 11.4 percent of the world’s remaining carbon budget required to keep global temperature rise to below 1.5°C, and would undermine Argentina’s commitment to the Paris Agreement. Instead, Argentina could harness its wind and solar resources as the country has among the world’s best wind resources in Patagonia and excellent solar irradiation. Combined with widespread energy efficiency programs, investment in wind and solar would create a win-win-win for Argentina: a future of cheaper, more resilient electricity supply, mitigation of climate disruption, and far greater potential for employment than the fossil fuel industry.

BOX 9: PUBLIC FINANCE FOR MOZAMBAQUE LNG AMIDST CYCLONES, FRAUD, AND DISPLACEMENT

G20 public finance institutions provided at least MZN 125 billion (USD 2.0 billion) a year in support to liquefied natural gas (LNG) development in northern Mozambique from 2016 to 2018, despite the climate implications of LNG. G20 public finance institutions and MDBs committed at least an additional MZN 366.8 billion (USD 5.4 billion) in 2019. At least seven export credit agencies, two development finance institutions, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank Group have authorised support for gas development, and a number of sizable new loans are being considered even as the gas region has become the epicentre of the country’s COVID-19 outbreak.

These LNG mega-developments are going forward in a context of severely limited options for Mozambique. Mozambique has historic debt both from colonialism and structural adjustment programs instituted by the International Monetary Fund. The burden of these has climbed in the wake of Cyclone Idai in 2019, when international public finance institutions offered conditional loans instead of debt-free climate finance. Compounding these factors, the International Monetary Fund and other international public finance institutions cut off aid to the country in 2019 following a fraud case, whereby international bankers and one Mozambican government official were charged for concealing USD 2 billion worth of loans and bonds, which they were hoping to repay from the proceeds of the oil and gas exploitation before anyone noticed.

Rather than the gas projects aiding development, violence from armed insurgents has spiked in the region with over 800 people killed and 100,000 fleeing the region since 2017. While the root cause of these attacks is unclear, communities near the gas developments have raised concerns that the pressure to protect foreign investment in the industry will further militarise the region. In addition, many locals have had their farmland taken from them without consultation or adequate compensation to make room for gas facilities. For instance, according to community members in the village of Milambe, the company Anadarko took advantage of the turmoil caused by the violent attacks and pressed forward with relocation of communities, but failed to secure farmland for the displaced families to be able to feed themselves.

The gas projects are unlikely to improve access to electricity because most of the gas is slated to be exported to Thailand and Japan among other countries and there are no plan. Furthermore, 75 percent of the country is not connected to a grid and there are no substantial plans to build out the grid to use LNG locally. Considering the financial, social, and environmental risks, G20 governments should be supporting distributed renewables in Mozambique over LNG.
Exclusions for investments in oil, gas, and coal must be put in place across the entire financial sector—for public and private actors alike—as soon as possible if we are to transition our energy systems in time to limit warming to 1.5°C. However, public finance institutions’ policies are still overwhelmingly allowing for massive investments in the expansion of the fossil fuel sector.

**COAL**

1. Three G20 countries—the United Kingdom, Canada, and France—have full or near-full restrictions on direct finance for coal from the public finance institutions included in this report, and a further 10 G20 countries have partial restrictions.

2. Three MDBs—European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank Group—have full or near full restrictions on direct finance for coal, and four other MDBs have partial restrictions.

3. The OECD Export Credit Group has placed restrictions on the support that OECD export credit agencies can provide for coal plants.

4. Despite these restrictions, in practice many institutions are still providing substantial indirect support through financial intermediaries, advisory services, and associated facilities.

**OIL AND GAS**

1. Three G20 countries—France, Germany, and Brazil—have partial restrictions on direct finance for oil and gas from the public finance institutions included in this report.

2. The EIB has a near complete restriction on direct finance for oil and gas that will come into effect after 2021. Six of the other MDBs have partial restrictions on oil and gas finance.

3. Most existing oil and gas restrictions are for upstream oil and gas, with very few at the refining or transportation levels.

4. Many institutions have restrictions on finance for oil and gas exploration that stem from considerations of financial risk rather than climate risk.

**CLOSING LOOPHOLES FOR INDIRECT FINANCE FOR FOSSIL FUELS**

Even when policies to exclude the direct finance of oil, gas, or coal are in place, some public finance institutions have continued to provide significant support through loopholes. These include:

1. Finance for financial intermediaries (typically commercial banks) that continued to invest in fossil fuels; and

2. The provision of advisory services, technical support, and policy-based lending to aid in the development of fossil fuel projects.

For example, the Japan International Cooperation Agency has provided policy support for the development of a number of national energy plans that are dependent on coal expansion, including for Myanmar. Proparco, a subsidiary of the Agence Française de Développement which finances private companies and financial institutions, channelled 46 percent of its funds via financial intermediaries in 2018, many of whom are highly exposed to fossil fuels.

It is important to underscore that the data presented in this report does not include most indirect finance for fossil fuels from G20 public finance institutions and MDBs due to limited transparency and reporting from these banks; even the scale of the influence these indirect mechanisms have is difficult to estimate.
BOX 10: PUBLIC FINANCE INSTITUTIONS WHO ARE LEADING THE WAY ON STOPPING FINANCE FOR OIL AND GAS

The unprecedented and growing public support for bold climate action through popular movements, legal challenges, opinion polls, and electoral discourse seen in the past few years has already shifted some public finance institutions’ actions to align more closely with the public goods. As detailed in this report, many public finance institutions have committed to end finance for coal. To meet the Paris goals, we urgently need to expand this group of “first movers” away from coal, and extend these restrictions to oil and gas. Some public financial actors are already leading the way in putting precedent-setting limits on oil and gas projects, including:

- **Exclusions for almost all direct fossil fuel finance:** Ireland’s national investment fund (announced 2018, to be implemented by 2023), the European Investment Bank (announced 2019, to begin 2021), and Swedfund (2017).125

- **Exclusions for finance for oil and gas exploration and extraction:** World Bank (announced 2017, to begin in 2019), all French public finance institutions (2019), and SEKN, Sweden’s export credit agency (2020).126

- **Other partial exclusions on oil and gas finance:** European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (no extraction for most oil, 2019), Germany’s KfW and KfW-Ipex Bank (no unconventional extraction, 2019), and the Royal Bank of Scotland (no exploration and a commitment to progressively withdraw finance for oil and gas majors that don’t have “Paris-aligned transition plans.” Announced 2020, to begin 2021).127

POLICY RESTRICTIONS IN G20 BILATERAL PUBLIC FINANCE EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES

The most substantial cross-institution fossil fuel restriction from ECAs is the OECD Coal-Fired Electricity Generation Sector Understanding, which is a relatively recent annex to the much larger 42-year-old Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. For details on the OECD restrictions for ECAs, see the section above on Export Credit Agencies.

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS

To date there are no widely held multilateral agreements on fossil fuel restrictions for DFIs as there are for MDBs and ECAs.
Table 4. Policies restricting fossil fuel support at bilateral institutions, by country. Red indicates there are no restrictions in place at any of the country’s included institutions, yellow a partial restriction or full restrictions at some institutions only, and green a full restriction across all institutions.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Banco de Inversion y Comercio Exterior</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>No exclusion policy in place but no coal support identified.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>Red — No exclusion policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Export Finance and Insurance Corporation</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>OECD restriction for ECAs, no other policy.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Brazilian Development Bank</td>
<td>127.8</td>
<td>No finance for coal plants.</td>
<td>No finance for oil-fired power plants.</td>
<td>Restriction for gas plant finance to 50% of total investment per project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>China Development Bank, China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation, China Silk Road Fund, Export-Import Bank of China</td>
<td>24,818.7</td>
<td>Green Credit Policy and US-China joint statement encouraged all Chinese banks to reduce finance to coal but placed no formal restrictions.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement, BPI France, Caisse des Depots et Consignations, Proparco</td>
<td>782.4</td>
<td>Full exclusion of coal, no coal support identified.</td>
<td>Exclusion of shale oil, and routine flaring for export credits. AFD exclusion for exploration production, and power plants.</td>
<td>Exclusion of shale gas, and routine flaring for export credits. AFD exclusion for exploration and production.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia Eximbank,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2199.5</td>
<td>OECD restriction for ECAs.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cassa Depositi e Prestiti,</td>
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<td>Commercio Estero</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9485.7</td>
<td>OECD restriction for ECAs applies to ECAs as well as JICA; recent statements from JBIC Governor claim they will no longer accept new applications to finance coal-fired power plants.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Bank of Japan,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Japan Oil Gas and Metals National Corporation, Nippon Export and Investment Insurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>6278.0</td>
<td>OECD restriction for ECAs, no finance for new coal plants within Korea.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
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<td>Export-Import Bank of Korea,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea Development Bank,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea Finance Corporation,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea Trade Insurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corporation</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>103.9</td>
<td>No exclusion policy in place, but no coal support identified.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banco National de Comercio</td>
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<td>Exterior, Nacional Financiera</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>2971.5</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
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<td>Export Insurance Agency of</td>
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<td>Russia, Russian Development Bank</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1082.8</td>
<td>No exclusion policy in place, but no coal support identified.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
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<td>Public Investment Fund, Saudi Fund for Development, Saudi Industrial Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>133.3</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Bank of Southern Africa, Export Credit Insurance Corporation, Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1683.4</td>
<td>No direct support for coal plants or mining across all institutions.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC Group Plc, Department for International Development, UK Export Finance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>758.8</td>
<td>OECD restriction for ECAs. A joint 2013 policy statement excludes new finance for overseas coal plants, but it is non-binding and DFC is currently considering new plants.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Import Bank of the United States, Development Finance Corporation (formerly Overseas Private Investment Corporation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
The nine MDBs included in this report have committed to aligning their financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, first doing so alongside the International Development Finance Club at the One Planet Summit in 2017. However, despite annual joint announcements since then, there is not yet any criteria in place for how to discern which projects are “Paris-aligned.” The proposed process appears to include substantial loopholes including a board-level veto for the approval of any projects deemed misaligned. To date, no MDB has put policies in place that are truly aligned with a 1.5°C future, although the EIB is clearly showing leadership in this area.

Table 5: Policies restricting fossil fuel support at MDBs. Red indicates there are no restrictions in place, yellow a partial restriction, and green a full restriction.

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<tr>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
<td>2099.1</td>
<td>Partial exclusion since 2013, nearly full exclusion after 2021. No coal support identified.</td>
<td>Nearly full exclusion for all “unabated” projects after 2021.</td>
<td>After 2021, no new “unabated” gas projects will be financed above a threshold of 250gCO₂/kWh, though there are undefined exceptions for power generation and transport infrastructure that make use of so-called “low-carbon” gases.</td>
<td>There is a commitment for all exclusions to include intermediaries, advisory and technical assistance, and associated facilities. However, the details are not yet defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
<td>1086.1</td>
<td>No thermal coal mining or coal plants.</td>
<td>Exclusion on exploration and upstream oil development after 2018 with few exceptions.</td>
<td>Minimal exclusions on gas, only additional screening of gas-related projects.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
<td>163.7</td>
<td>No exclusion policy in place but no coal support identified.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>Verbal but not yet written commitment to end all coal support.</td>
<td>No exploration.</td>
<td>No exploration.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>1505.0</td>
<td>Verbal commitments to only support coal “in countries where there is no alternative.”</td>
<td>No exploration. No extraction with some exceptions.</td>
<td>No exploration.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
<td>530.0</td>
<td>No exclusion policy in place but no coal support identified.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
<td>1808.1</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No exploration.</td>
<td>No exploration.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Development Bank</td>
<td>300.0</td>
<td>No exclusion policy in place, but no coal support identified.</td>
<td>No exclusion policy in place, but no oil support identified.</td>
<td>No exclusion policies.</td>
<td>No relevant policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PUBLIC FINANCE POLICIES FOR A JUST TRANSITION
To date, few of the public finance institutions included in this report have explicit policies or facilities targeted at assisting workers and impacted communities through a transition away from fossil fuels, but they have the potential to play a critical role. In Recommendations for Policymakers below we provide a full list of the policies needed for public finance institutions to do so, but here we include some existing examples where institutions have incorporated them into their energy or sustainability policies:

- In their 2019 Energy Lending Policy, the European Investment Bank established an Energy Transition Package to provide extra support to those states or regions with a more challenging transition path. This includes advisory services, a higher maximum level of finance for relevant projects, and the prioritization of projects that support economic development and job creation in the most fossil fuel-dependent economies.  

- In their 2019-2022 Energy Transition Strategy, French DFI Agence Française de Développement committed to supporting sectoral modelling and planning tools for a clean energy transition, stakeholder consultations for energy reform planning, and university and vocational training key to transitioning workers. However, it is worth noting that there are no targets or goals specified for this work yet.
G20 GOVERNMENTS
Public finance has long played a significant role in determining the direction of the energy sector, and its impacts are poised to multiply as governments prepare stimulus responses to COVID-19. G20 governments should direct the public’s money away from fossil fuels and toward climate solutions that will protect jobs and build a more resilient economy. In line with their common but differentiated responsibilities, G20 governments must:

- Support a global just recovery to COVID-19 which carves a path to resilient, equitable, and zero-carbon societies instead of further locking in fossil fuel production and use. Recovery packages in response to COVID-19 must bail out workers and communities, not banks and polluting corporations. They must ensure a globally just outcome by prioritising debt-free finance to the lowest-income countries and communities.

- End all public finance for oil, gas, and coal projects after 2020. G20 governments should adopt explicit commitments both domestically and internationally to end financing for fossil fuels. This phase-out should include ending all support for fossil fuel exploration, extraction, transportation, and power plants. In addition, G20 governments must ensure that there are no loopholes that allow “indirect” public finance for fossil fuels to continue through related infrastructure, advisory services, technical assistance, or financial intermediaries.

- Rapidly scale up investment in clean energy, energy efficiency, just transition plans, and energy access. G20 governments must align all lending and operations with a high-probability and equitable 1.5°C pathway by the end of 2020. In particular this must include support for the implementation of just transition plans developed with workers and communities who are dependent on fossil fuels. The plans must include climate finance for the most vulnerable countries to pursue their chosen low-carbon development pathways, as well as off-grid and mini-grid renewable energy in regions where access to electricity and clean cooking are the lowest. At the project level, clean energy investments must ensure the free, prior, and informed consent of impacted communities.

- Ensure transparent and timely reporting on all energy finance. G20 governments should require all public institutions to provide timely accounting of the full life-cycle emissions of the projects they support. They should provide the amount and type of financing, and details on the projects and subprojects supported. This is the bare minimum needed in order to have a clear picture of the climate impact of the projects financed by G20, which in the case of fossil fuel projects, will continue to pollute for decades after the support is repaid. This information allows affected communities and organisations to provide input, have a clear understanding of which projects G20 governments are involved in, and monitor the implementation of those projects.

INSTITUTION-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
In addition to the cross-cutting policies discussed above, specific types of institutions must take the following steps:

- Export credit agencies (ECAs). ECAs in OECD countries must close the loopholes in the OECD Coal-Fired Electricity Generation Sector Understanding that have allowed Australia, Japan, Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa to continue to support coal projects. The Sector Understanding should cover all activities that facilitate any coal exploitation on a full life-cycle basis. This would include all coal plants and related coal infrastructure, such as mines and transportation, no matter the technology or when the environmental impact assessment was conducted. It should also cover indirect coal lending through financial intermediaries and
be extended past the OECD on to the International Working Group on Export Credits (IWG), an initiative started by the United States and China in 2012 to create global guidelines on export credits. Moreover, all ECAs should follow the example of those in France and Sweden, which have placed restrictions on ECA support for oil and gas, and go even further to end all support for all fossil fuels.

- **Development finance institutions (DFIs).** Unlike ECAs, most DFIs have explicit mandates to ensure that their support aids development. Now is the time to evaluate how well DFI support is adhering to their development mandates. DFIs must re-envision their development mandates to ensure that development is fossil free, sustainable, clean, and equitable.

- **Multilateral development banks (MDBs).** MDBs must ensure their Paris alignment framework is robust and that it includes restrictions on direct and indirect finance for all fossil fuels and related infrastructure after 2020. This framework should build upon restrictions on oil and gas that have been put in place at the European Investment Bank and World Bank Group and include specific facilities to assist a just transition.
APPENDIX: INSTITUTIONS INCLUDED IN THIS REPORT

It is important to note many institutions provide a mix of services. ECAs may provide bilateral development finance in addition to export credits. For example, KfW provides support for domestic projects, bilateral aid, and export finance. National development banks, such as China Development Bank and Russian Development Bank (VEB), provide domestic financing as well as international financing. There are also bilateral aid agencies such as JICA that may provide loans, grants, policy lending, and technical assistance. Generally, these institutions provide energy finance internationally, but they sometimes also provide domestic support. These domestic projects are also included where information was available.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
- European Investment Bank (EIB)
- Asian Development Bank (ADB)
- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
- Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
- African Development Bank (AfDB)
- Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)
- New Development Bank (NDB)
- Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

Export Credit Agencies (ECAs)
No export credit institutions for Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are included in this report due to lack of transparency or standardised reporting.
- Australia: Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC)
- Canada: Export Development Canada (EDC - includes both Corporate Account and Canada Account)
- China: Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM) China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE)

Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)
- Argentina: Banco de Iversion y Comercio Exterior (BICE)
- Australia: Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA)
- Brazil: Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)
- Canada: PPP Canada Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC)
- China: China Development Bank (CDB) China Silk Road Fund (SRF)

- France: Agence Française de Développement (AFD) Caisse des Depots et Consignations (CDC France) Proparco BPIFrance Investissement and BPIFrance Financement
- Germany: KfW Group (including KfW Development Bank, KfW IPEX-Bank, and the German Investment & Development Corporation (DEG))
- Italy: Cassa depositi e prestiti (CDP)
- Japan: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Japan Oil Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) Development Bank of Japan (DBJ)
- Korea: Korea Development Bank (KDB) Korea Finance Corporation (KoFC) Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)
- Mexico: Nacional Financiera
- Russia: VEB-RF (formerly Vnesheconombank)
- Saudi Arabia: Public Investment Fund Saudi Fund for Development Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF)
- South Africa: Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDCSA)
- Turkey (no data available for the relevant institutions)
- United Kingdom: CDC Group Plc (CDC UK) Department for International Development (DFID)
- United States: International Development Finance Corporation (DFC, formerly Overseas Private Investment Corporation)
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13 It is important to note these numbers are for exploration and extraction investments only and do not include billions more in operational expenditure, midstream and downstream transport, processing, and export facilities. Two-thirds of this would take place in new fields where development has not yet started, and investments have not yet been sanctioned. This means most planned investments can still be avoided with relatively little opportunity cost, well below the costs of continuing down a path of oil and gas expansion. For more see Overexposed: How the IPCCs 1.5°C report demonstrates the risks of oil and gas, Global Witness, April 2019, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/overexposed/.


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Green
New Deal
MEANS
Good Green
Union Jobs